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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to measure the potential and real effect of universal child care cash benefit schemes on 
female labour supply. This subsidy, which was considered ground-breaking due to the fact that it was available to all, 
was introduced through the Spanish Government Act 35/2007 (BOE, 2007) and was in effect until 2010. Known as 
the “baby bonus”, this subsidy of €2,500 per child born aimed to increase the birth rate in Spain. The introduction of 
this family policy provides a unique setting for a quasi-experiment, using semi-parametric DiD analysis and 
individual panel data sourced from the EU-SILC dataset. The results provide evidence of the positive effect of a cash-
for-care subsidy that reduces the costs of a new child and increases female labour supply. 
Keywords: Female Labour Supply, Spanish “Baby Bonus”, DiD Method. 
Efecto de la prestación monetaria universal para el cuidado de 
hijos en la oferta de trabajo femenina en España 
RESUMEN 
El objetivo de este estudio consiste en analizar el impacto potencial y real de la prestación monetaria universal para el 
cuidado de hijos en la participación de la mujer en el mercado de trabajo. Dicha medida innovadora por ser 
"universal" fue introducida con la aprobación de la Ley 35/2007 (BOE, 2007), y estuvo vigente hasta el año 2010. La 
medida conocida como "“cheque-bebé” consistió en una aportación de 2.500 € por nacimiento con el objetivo de 
estimular la tasa de natalidad. Esta medida proporciona un escenario único para realizar un cuasi-experimento. Para 
ello se emplea DiD semiparamétrico y regresión con panel de datos individuales, tomando como base la ECV en 
datos longitudinales para el periodo 2007-2010. Los resultados obtenidos prueban el efecto positivo de la medida en 
la oferta de trabajo femenino en España al tiempo que reduce los costes del nuevo hijo. 
Palabras clave: Participación femenina en el mercado de trabajo, "cheque bebé", método DiD. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Most OECD countries have seen a progressive decline in their birth rates in 
recent years. The most significant decline occurs in most countries between 
1970 and 1995, falling from an average of 2.67 children per woman1 to 1.69, 
below the replacement level. In a number of countries such as Norway, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom and France, the fall partially recovers between 1995 and 
2010. In others, such as Finland and Denmark, the level remains practically the 
same throughout the whole period. As the birth rate decreases, there is a 
continuous and progressive increase in both female employment and the 
participation of women in the labour market. Historically, this negative 
relationship is the one most frequently encountered, with the real wages of 
women, together with the opportunity cost of not working, on the rise, how it is 
observed in Fig. 1 (1980). In this process of ‘recovery’, family-policy measures 
aimed at encouraging the birth rate to rise and enabling parents to achieve a 
work-life balance have played an important role. Public child care policy is 
supposed to help families reconcile work and family life and increase parents’ 
participation in the workforce. In recent years, a positive correlation has been 
found between fertility and female participation in the labour market in some 
countries (Fig. 1: 2010). 
Figure 1 
Total Fertility Rate/Female Employment Rate 
1980 2010 
  
Source: Employment rates - OECD Employment Outlook UN World Statistics Pocketbook, 2010; 
Fertility rates - National statistical authorities, UN Statistical Division and Eurostat 
Demographic Statistics, 2010. 
1 Source: OECD. 
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In Spanish case, the fertility rate with an average of 1.27 children per 
woman2 and the female labour force participation rate of 50.3% are lower than 
the European Union average (1.55 children per woman in EU_28 and 60% of 
female labour force participation rate)3. Spain has one of the lowest fertility 
rates in the world (Fig. 2), a situation that is exacerbated by decreasing marriage 
rates, the older average age of maternity and increasing life expectancy at birth. 
This reason leads us to believe that not enough effort has been made to 
reconcile having children and the full inclusion of women in labour markets. In 
this sense, Aldaz and Eguía (2016), Martínez et al., (2011) and Vega et al., 
(2016) among others, analyse the process unequal of the incorporation of 
women to responsibility positions in Spain. In the family unit, women primarily 
take responsibility for the care of the children (Martínez et al., opus cit.). 
Results from the Economically Active Population Survey (Spanish National 
Institute of Statistics) indicate that in 2007 only 0.53% of employed men 
applied for paternity leave, whereas 7.48% of employed women and 10.12% of 
employed women of reproductive age (16 to 45) took maternity leave (Table 
A1, appendix). By 2011, the percentage of men had risen to 1.10% on average, 
and for women, the percentage had also risen to 8.60% and 12.34%, 
respectively. The EU-SILC4 2007-2010 reported that between 2007 and 2008, 
26.14% of women are dedicated to the care of children or other dependents. This 
percentage increased to 27.47% between 2009 and 2010; the corresponding 
values for men were 0.07% and 0.15%, respectively. The percentage increases to 
40% in women aged 51-65 years, where a disconnection from the workforce has 
already taken place. The difficulty in maintaining the job or the difficulty in 
reconciling work and family life after having children can sometimes lead to a 
definitive separation from the labour market (De la Rica and Iza, 2005). 
In response to the gradual aging of the Spanish population, resulting not only 
from increased life expectancy but also from the significant decline in fertility, 
in November 2007 the Spanish Government published Act 35/2007 (BOE, 
2007). This measure significantly increased the amount of monetary support 
available to women having children. It was a universal measure that affected 
both women already active in the workforce and women who were not. The 
subsidy, in principle, was conceived as an incentive to stimulate the birth rate, 
but given the background discussed above, and the low level of female labour 
force participation in Spain, this measure was also expected to have a positive 
effect on the supply of working women. Moreover, the ratio between family 
child care benefits and average net salary was not high enough for the income 
2 1.53 children per non-Spanish woman and 1.23 children per Spanish woman (2013). Source: 
INE. 
3 Source: EUROSTAT, 2013. 
4 European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions. 
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effect to compensate for a lower number of hours of work. Our baseline 
hypothesis is that in countries with low female labour force participation, as is 
the case of Spain, this type of policy measure fosters the participation of women 
in the labour market. If so, the universal child care cash benefit in Spain can be 
considered an appropriate measure to encourage a rise in birth rates, especially 
in the context of the austerity measures that have plagued Europe in recent 
years, increasing economic and social inequalities, particularly to the detriment 
of women. 
Figure 2 
Total Fertility Rate (%) 
 
Source: Eurostat and OECD. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a summary 
of previous research on this topic. The data and variables used in the analysis 
are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy and the 
obtained results. Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions and policy 
implications. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a considerable amount of literature on child care and female labour 
supply. Heckman (1974) showed that an increase in child care costs reduces the 
labour supply of mothers and the number of hours worked. Theoretically, if the 
cost of having children is reduced, the demand for children increases (Cigno, 
1991). However, this increased liquidity could be allocated to providing a 
higher quality upbringing. In general, the theory predicts that a child care 
subsidy produces a substitution effect and an income effect. Schøne (2004) 
states that both effects move in the same direction, leading to a reduction in 
labour supply. If child care support is available, family budgets increase, and if 
leisure is considered a normal good, there is a preference for more leisure 
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activities and labour supply falls. However, Bauernschuster and Schlotter 
(2015) support the hypothesis that marginal decreases in the cost of child care 
do not affect the labour supply of mothers if employment rates and rates of the 
care of children, are high. Most research to date shows that child care subsidies 
lead to a rise in the participation of women in the labour market (Bos et al., 
1999; Granger and Cryton, 1999; Blau and Tekin, 2007). Nevertheless, when 
both the participation of women in the labour market and the working hours are 
very high, the subsidy might not generate increased participation in the labour 
market but rather the opposite, so participation in the labour force might fall as 
more hours are devoted to child care (Naz, 2004). The subsidy produces an 
income effect that compensates for lost wages by reducing work hours offered. 
Literature on the impact of measures to reduce the cost of child care includes 
a number of studies that prove the positive impact of cash benefits on the 
fertility rate (Barmby and Cigno, 1990; González, 2013). However, these results 
vary from one country to the next in relation with the labour supply of women 
(Gauthier and Hatzius, 1997; Laroque and Salanie, 2003; Del Boca, 2002). We 
also found other studies of countries where the monetary cost of child care had 
no impact on the labour supply of women (Del Boca and Vuri, 2007; Lundin, 
Mork and Ockert, 2008). The impact of cash benefits on the participation of 
women in the labour market differs according to their individual starting 
conditions, in addition to personal characteristics such as level of education, 
salary, age, marital status, number of children, etc. (Naz, 2004; Blau and Tekin, 
2007; Viitanen, 2005; Bettendorf, Jongen and Muller, 2012). Overall, there is 
an ambiguous effect of public policies on female labour force participation 
(Gruber, 1994; Rønsen, 2001, 2009; Schøne, 2004; Bauernschuster and 
Schlotter, 2013; Guest and Parr, 2013). Rønsen (2001) shows that with the 
introduction of cash benefits, mothers move from full-time work to part-time 
work. Naz (opus cit.,) analyses the impact of a € 400 / month benefit payment to 
families with children in Norway between the ages of one and three, who do not 
utilize state-subsidized day care centers. The results show that the reform 
reduced women’s labour force participation. However, the effects depend on 
women’s schooling; in particular, the labour force participation of highly-
educated mothers fell by more than that of mothers with a lower level of 
education. Havnes and Mogstad (2011) analyse a staged expansion of 
subsidized child care in Norway. Difference-in-differences estimates reveal that 
there is little, if any, causal effect of subsidized child care on maternal 
employment. However, Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008) analyse the new child-
care policy5 implemented in Québec (Canada) in 1997, finding that the policy 
5 Licensed child-care service providers began offering day-care spaces at the reduced fee of $5.00 
per day per child for children aged 4. By 2000, the policy applied to all children not in 
kindergarten. 
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had a large and statistically significant impact on the labour supply of mothers 
with preschool children. 
In Spain, there have been numerous studies analyzing the impact of having 
children on women's participation in the labour market (De la Rica and Ferrero, 
2003; Gutiérrez-Doménech, 2008). More specifically, in the context of the 
analysis of this paper, Sánchez-Mangas and Sánchez-Marcos (2008) analyse the 
effect of a monthly cash benefit payment of €100 per child under three years of 
age for working mothers that was introduced in Spain in 2003. Their results 
indicate a small but significant positive effect of the policy with respect to the 
labour market participation rate for mothers of children under three. In the 
present study, however, we focus on a universal cash benefit payment that 
affects women regardless of whether they participate in the labour market or 
not. Sánchez-Mangas et al., (opus cit.,), and more recently, González (2013) 
relied on the Labour Force Survey (LFS). Since we use the DiD method in this 
analysis, we chose not to use the LFS in order to avoid possible bias, as the 
sample of individuals differs in each quarter (Meyer, 1995; Bertrand, Duflo and 
Mullainathan, 2004; Vicens Otero, 2008). Moreover, as we can see in the 
following section, multiple treatment and comparison groups allow us to 
perform further checks of hypotheses and may allow hypotheses to be refined 
and alternative explanations to be ruled out (Abadie, 2003; 2005; Meyer, 
1995:151). Nollenberger and Rodríguez-Planas (2011) analyse the effects of a 
large-scale provision of publicly subsidized child care for all three-year olds in 
Spain in the early 1990s. Their estimates show that the policy led to a sizable 
increase in employment (8%) and hours worked (9%) of mothers with age-
eligible (three-year-old) children. These effects persisted over time, however, 
the effects quickly faded away among mothers without a high-school 
qualification. 
3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC 
2007-2010) provides the data used for our empirical analysis. It is a nationwide 
survey on household and personal characteristics as well as labour force 
participation. This survey includes useful micro data that provide information 
on variables that affect the decision of whether to participate in the labour 
market, such as education, income and marital status. It was conceived as a 
rotating panel survey6. So despite not being a pure panel survey, it allows us to 
6 For each cycle (year), a quarter of the sample (25%) is renewed. Every year there is an overlap of 
three of the four parts (75%) of the sample from the previous year. For each subsample in this 
survey, selection follows a two-stage design with stratification of the units of the first stage. The 
first stage of the survey includes census tracts while the second stage includes mainly family 
households. 
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obtain the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator using one wave of the EU-
SILC from 2007 to 2010, avoiding the sample attrition from a pure panel. The 
survey includes longitudinal information, i.e. it refers to the same people at 
different moments of time. In this case, it tracks a four-year period. One year 
prior to policy implementation (2007) and the three following years (2008-
2010). The survey consists of four files: basic household data, basic individual 
data, detailed household data and detailed data from adults. The EU-SILC 2007-
2010 survey contains information on 88,211 households, 72,464 adults of whom 
34,472 are men and 37,992 are women. 
The analysis is performed on two different criteria of selecting individuals 
from the same survey. Regarding the first criterion, women are chosen for the 
treatment group and the control group, taking into account the fertile age and 
working age of women, respectively 7. The analysis consists of testing the 
potential effect of the policy on the working hours of women of fertile age who 
work. In this case, the treatment group, namely the group potentially affected by 
the measure, comprises 20- to 50-year-old women and the control group, 51- to 
65-year-old women. The former are women of fertile age and working age, 
while the latter are only of working age. With respect to the second criterion, 
those families who received family support for the care of dependent children 
are selected. In this case, the real impact of the measure is analysed in terms of 
hours supplied by working women whose household has received child care 
support.  
We have analysed the sample and no structural changes are observed in the 
behaviour of both groups (treatment and control) during the period of analysis. 
That is, they are homogeneous groups in terms of characteristics8 (marital 
status, education, employment status, work situation, work experience, health, 
net income, hours worked per week, receipt of family child care support). For 
instance, most of the women in the sample are married (54.25% of the sample 
as a whole), followed by single (27.97%) and widowed (12.58%), with similar 
distributions in both the treatment and the control groups. 
As for education, and with respect to the first selection criterion, the greatest 
percentage in the treatment group is for higher education levels. Not so in the 
control group, where the highest percentage is that of elementary education. 
This tendency continues throughout the entire sample period. There is no 
structural change in the sample from one cycle to the next. With respect to the 
second criterion, the most common level of education in the treatment group 
(women who have received family child care support) is higher education. With 
respect to the control group (women who have not received family child care 
7 Note that Gruber (1994) also takes women of certain ages as the treated group. 
8 The distribution of the sample according to the cycle of the survey and characteristics between 
groups could be observed on request. 
Estudios de Economía Aplicada, 2017: 801-818   Vol. 35-3 
                                                 
ANASTASIA HERNÁNDEZ ALEMÁN, CARMELO J. LEÓN AND LAURA MÁRQUEZ-RAMOS 808 
support), the most common level of education is primary education. There is 
less difference in education levels between the two groups chosen with the 
second selection criterion. In the treatment group (20-50 years old), 37.02% of 
women have the highest level of education in 2007 and 36.20% in 2010, while 
in the control group (51-65 years old), the corresponding values are 15.27% and 
19.32%, respectively. As mentioned, the difference between the percentages for 
the treatment and control groups is lower in relation to the second criterion. In 
the treatment group (received family child care support), 29.23% of women 
have the highest level of education in 2007 and 37.32% in 2010, while in the 
control group (without family child care support), the corresponding values are 
21.57% and 24.18%, respectively.  
Women’s accumulated years of work is very similar throughout the sample 
period, amounting to around 17 years. By age group, women in the control 
group (51-65 years old) have slightly more than twice as many years of 
experience compared to women in the treatment group (20-50 years old). 
However, in several cases, the difference in work experience between the 
treatment group and the control group based on whether they received child care 
support or not, is less than four years.  
Regarding employment status, what is surprising is the large percentage of 
women working part-time and women engaged in housework and child care 
compared to men. Both work situations in the case of women stand at around 
34% on average, while in the case of men the percentage is less than 2%. 
However, when the analysis is performed by group, a higher percentage of 
women aged 20-50 who work full-time is observed (around 50%). In this group 
of women, there was a significant decline from 2008 onwards of women 
engaged in housework and child care, falling from 16.42% in 2007 to 11.96% in 
2010. Interestingly, and contrary to the treatment group (women of 20-50 years 
old) where women working full-time predominate, in the control group (women 
aged 51-65) it is dedication to housework and child care that predominates. 
Regarding women’s employment status, the most recent and frequent change, 
showing a substantial increase as of 2008, is the transition from employed to 
unemployed, rising from 29.34% in 2007 to 43.27% in 2009. No major 
differences exist between the treatment and control group, as the same general 
trend is observed. 
As health affects participation in the labour market, we examine group 
differences in this respect. In general, for women, higher percentages are 
concentrated in the first three levels of the survey: very good, good and fair 
health. Percentages are stable throughout the sample period. By age group, the 
highest percentages remain concentrated in “good” health. Nevertheless, in the 
control group (51-65 years old) the percentage of “very good” drops 
considerably. Additionally, disparities in health between the treatment group 
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and the control group determined according to the second selection criteria are 
lower than those between the treatment group and control group determined by 
age. From this perspective, therefore, the groups are also more homogeneous 
when taking into account whether women received family child care support or 
not than with respect to the groups per age.  
In relation to the income, the average annual net income of women stands at 
€5267.69, lower than the average corresponding amount for men (€8747.31). 
By cycle, the highest annual average net income (€5490.52) corresponds, within 
the group of women, to the last cycle. By group, there is a disparity between the 
treatment group (20-50 years old) and the control group (51-65 years old) in 
terms of average annual net income. While the treatment group has an average 
annual income above the average of the group of women with €7097.57 per 
year in 2007, the control group was below the average (€4439.10). In the 
treatment and control group by family child care support, the previous disparity 
is also observed in the first two cycles of the survey. However, this disparity is 
lower in the last two cycles. 
In relation to the hours worked per week, there is no significant difference 
between groups determined by age, as shown by the test for equality of means. 
Differences in groups according to whether they receive family support or not, 
are somewhat larger than in the previous assumption; nonetheless, the test for 
equality of means shows that these differences are not significant. As for the 
hours worked according to marital status, separated and divorced work more 
hours on average. Married women work the fewest hours per week. The same 
trend is observed in the treatment and control groups.  
Following this study of the individual characteristics, it can be seen that the 
treatment and the control groups determined according to whether or not the 
family receives child care support are more homogeneous than those groups 
based on age. We can thus state that, for the DiD analysis, the second selection 
criterion (whether families received support for the care of dependent children) 
represents a better criterion than that of selecting individuals by age. 
4. METHOD AND RESULTS 
4.1. Approach  
To estimate the effect of the reduction of the cost of fertility on female 
labour supply, we use the DiD approach, which is well-established in labour 
economics9, of increasing use and with sound new methodological contributions 
(see, for example, Fricke, 2017). The main empirical strategy is as follows. We 
compare two groups (treatment and control) and two periods (before and after 
9 Card and Krueger (1994); Meyer (1995); Bertrand et al., (2004), among others. 
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the policy change). The DiD estimator requires the treatment and control groups 
to be the same before and after the application of the measure. The groups are 
selected according to the condition of the measure so that there is a group, 
affected by the measure, women aged 20-50 years old (i.e., the treatment 
group). And another group that is not affected by the measure, women aged 51-
65 years old (i.e., the control group). A second alternative is considered to 
distinguish the treatment and control groups according to whether they receive 
direct family child care support or not. Thus, a second treatment group is made 
up of women who received child care benefit payments and a second control 
group is comprised of those who did not. In the first alternative, where the 
groups are determined only by age, the potential effect of the measure is 
analysed, while in the second, the actual effect of the measure is analysed in 
terms of hours worked per week. 
The outcome variable is defined as regular hours devoted to the main job 
before and after implementation of the family policy in both groups and allows 
us to obtain a measure of its causal impact. The following analysis is performed 
(Wooldridge, 2010): 
{ } { }1 ' 1 0 ' 01 0t t t tATT E Y Y D E Y Y D= − = − − =  [1] 
According to this expression, '1tY  is hours worked by the treatment group 
following implementation of the policy. tY1  is hours worked by the treatment 
group prior to implementation of the policy. '0tY  is hours worked by the control 
group following implementation of the policy. tY0  is hours worked by the 
control group prior to implementation of the policy. D is a dummy variable 
which is equal to 1 for the treatment group (D=1) and 0 for the control group. 
So, the outcome variable in specification (1) is weekly hours of work of the two 
groups of women during the same time period before and after implementation 
of the family policy, thus alleviating any macroeconomic shocks occurring 
during the period under study. To overcome the biases that may result from 
unobservable characteristics, the sample should be the same throughout the 
period. This method of estimating DiD allows us to obtain a measure of the 
causal effect that the reduction of the cost of fertility has on female labour 
supply. The average treatment effect in the treatment group which is known as 
ATT (average effect of treatment on the treated) can also be estimated in a 
regression model as follows:  
( ) ( )' 1ist ist istY T t Dα λ γ δ ε= + = + = + Ι +  [2] 
Where, istY  is the result, in this case the hours worked in period t by each 
individual i in group s; λ  denotes the time effect after treatment (T=t'); γ  is 
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the systematic difference in outcome for treatment group effect (D=1); δ  the 
treatment effect; ( ) ( )11'1 ===Ι DtTist  is a dummy variable to control for the 
treatment effect following implementation of the family policy. Finally, 
[ ] 0, =tsistE ε . To control for the other observable variables in relation to the 
most significant socioeconomic aspects (Xist) the model is enriched as follows:    
( ) ( ) '' 1ist ist ist istY T t D Xα λ γ δ β ε= + = + = + Ι + +  [3] 
4.2. Results  
The ATT effects from DiD are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The period of 
analysis is 2007-2010, which covers the year prior to implementation of the 
family policy (2007) and the three following years (2008-2010), in order to 
analyse the subsequent effect of the adoption of the policy. The estimation of 
Equation (1) shows that there was an increase in average working hours in the 
treatment group as a result of the implementation of the family policy and then, 
as a decrease in the cost of fertility. The average effect was +0.61 as potential 
effect (see Table 1) and +1.94 as real effect (see Table 2)10. In this case, the 
change in hours worked by women is exclusively due to the policy as the 
control group is not affected by the measure and the variation of the number of 
hours worked in this group should only be due to economic circumstances, 
macroeconomic shocks or preferences. As no structural change is observed 
under the period under study11, and the same sample is considered before and 
after the implementation of the policy, the change in the hours worked in the 
treatment group is due to the effect of the policy. 
According to the obtained results, the supply of female working hours 
increases in the treatment group. The “baby bonus” covers the need to increase 
the number of hours of work for women. So when the cost of fertility is 
reduced, the non-labour income might help to pay for child care and facilitates 
increased participation in the labour market. This result makes sense in a 
10 We have experimented with other groups of age and with an alternative survey. For example, 
when using as the treatment group women aged 16-45 and as the control group women aged more 
than 45 years old in the EU-SILC 2007-2010, we obtain a positive potential effect of the “baby 
bonus” measure (+0.57). Otherwise, when relying on information from the Economically Active 
Population Survey (EAPS), the result is negative (-0.54). This difference in results obtained in the 
two surveys is most likely due to the different design of the surveys. While in the EAPS each 
household, once selected, only remains in the survey during six consecutive trimesters, the EU-
SILC 2007-2010 is a rotating longitudinal panel. 
11 The same pattern of behavior is observed in both groups (data are displayed on request). The 
test for equality of means of the hours worked shows that there are not significant differences 
between treatment and control groups. Groups are determined according to age and according 
to whether they receive family benefits or not. 
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country where the participation of women in the labour market is not very high. 
In fact, in Spain female labour force participation is not only significantly lower 
than the European average, but the opportunity costs of not working for women 
are also relatively high as there is a persistent gap between opportunities 
provided to men and women in modern-day Spain. 
Table 1 
DiD estimate. EU-SILC 2007-2010. Potential Effect. Eq. (1). 
Variable 
Treatment Group: 
Women aged between  
20 and 50 [ ]1Y  
Control Group: 
Women aged between 
51 and 65 
[ ]0Y  
Hours worked per week in 2007 
[ ]tY ;1,0  
36.75 
(Std. err.= 0.27;n=1,398) 
37.63 
(Std. err.= 0.59;n=359) 
Hours worked per week between  
2008-2010      
[ ]';1,0 tY  
36.16 
(Std. err.= 0.09;n=10,070) 
36.43 
(Std. err.= 0.19;n=3,048) 
Difference -0.59 -1.2 
Source: Own elaboration. 
{ } { } [ ] [ ]1 ' 1 0 ' 01 0 36.16 36.75 36.43 37.63 0.59 1.2 0.61t t t tATT E Y Y D E Y Y D= − = − − = = − − − =− + =+
 
Table 2 
DiD estimate. EU-SILC 2007-2010. Real Effect. Eq. (1). 
Variable 
Treatment Group: 
Women with family support[ ]1=DY  
Control Group: 
Women without family 
support[ ]0=DY  
Hours worked per week in 2007  
[ ]tDY ;1,0=  
32.76 
(Std. err.= 1.09;n=86) 
37.08 
(Std. err.= 0.25;n=1694) 
Hours worked per week between 
2008-2010       
[ ]';1,0 tDY =  
33.96 
(Std. err.= 0.40;n=744) 
36.34 
(Std. err.= 0.09;n=11,761) 
Difference +1.2 -0.74 
Source: Own elaboration. 
{ } { } [ ] [ ]1 ' 1 0 ' 01 0 33.96 32.76 36.34 37.08 1.2 0.74 1.94t t t tATT E Y Y D E Y Y D= − = − − = = − − − = + =+
 
Table 3 summarises the results of the regression analysis for the potential 
and the real effect, respectively. In a first step, we estimate Equation (2) by OLS 
(using clustered standard errors). Our results show that the ATT effect is very 
similar to that obtained by DiD (Tables 1 and 2). In a second step, we add three 
control variables to the initial model, as they could affect the supply of hours of 
work by women: level of education, marital status and family support. The 
family support variable measures family child care support in the estimated 
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model for the treatment and control groups according to age (Table 3 column ii, 
potential effect). 
Table 3 
ATT effect estimated by OLS_vce (cluster) 
Independent variables 
Potential Effect Real Effect 
Model 
(i) (ii) (i) (ii) 





























Level of education - 0.61 (0.08) - 
0.58 
(0.03) 
Marital status - -2.04 (0.28) - 
-1.95 
(0.04) 
Family Support - -0.0005 (0.000) 
- - 
R2 0.007 0.0135 0.0041 0.0139 
Root MSE 10.2 10.1 10.2 10.1 
Number of obs. 14,214 14,285 
Source: EU-SILC 2007-2010. Own elaboration. 
The results show that the value of the constant term is similar to the average 
number of hours worked by the group of women during this period; around 36 
hours a week. The estimated coefficients present the expected sign. Firstly, the 
level of education is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for women with a 
higher level of education and 0 otherwise (see Table 4). The sign of the estimated 
coefficient for this variable is positive indicating that the higher the level of 
education, in this case, college education, the higher the supply of hours of work 
compared to the other levels of education. In fact, the higher the level of 
education, the better the working conditions in terms of wages and working hours 
tend to be. Thus, the opportunity cost of one hour of work is higher than in the 
rest of the levels of education. Similarly, a positive correlation is found between 
income and level of education. Previously, Lemieux (2006) established a direct 
relationship between the highest level of wages and high levels of education. 
Secondly, related literature that analyses the participation of women in the 
labour market (Fitzpatrick, 2012) usually divides groups according to marital 
status, and we therefore include this variable as a control in our regression. The 
marital status variable takes the value of 1 for married women and 0 otherwise. 
Married women work fewer hours, which is probably due to there being another 
family income (non-labour income or income of the spouse) and may also be 
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due to the dependents of older married women. Family support is a variable 
introduced only in the model estimated with treatment and control groups 
according to age, i.e in the analysis of the potential effect (Table 3 column ii). It 
is a proxy variable of there being children in the household12. The estimated 
coefficient is negative signed and statistically significant and so the existence of 
children in the household reduces the working hours of mothers. The average 
effect of treatment on the treated (ATT) remains positive and its quantitative 
impact is greater in model ii than in model i. The real effect is higher than the 
potential effect in both estimations. The estimated coefficients of time and group 
variables are negative signed. More specifically, the time effect is negative, as 
well as the supply of working hours in the treatment group. The negative impact 
obtained for the time effect could be explained by the economic crisis, which is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the period 2008 to 2010 and 0 for 
2007. The sign of the coefficient that captures the effect of the group is also 
negative. Also regarding the results of estimating Equation (3), efficiency and 
accuracy of the model increases as more regressors are included, as expected, and 
in particular, when those variables related to individual characteristics-level of 
education, marital status and family support-are included. The result of the 
estimation shows that the time effect and the group effect, as well as the impact of 
the measure (ATT) are statistically significant; the estimated coefficients keep the 
same sign and almost the same value in terms of magnitude.  
Table 4 
Definitions of the variables 
Variables Definitions 
Dependent variable Hours of work supplied per week 
Treatment group (first criterion) 20-50 year-old women 
Control group (first criterion) 51 to 65 year-old women 
Treatment group (second criterion) Working women whose household has received child care support 
Control group (second criterion) Working women whose household doesn't have received child care support 
Level of education Level of education is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for women with a higher level of education and 0 otherwise 
Marital status The marital status variable takes the value of 1 for married women and 0 otherwise. 
Family Support Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if household has received child care support and 0 otherwise. 
ATT The average effect of the measure. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
12 If financial support for childcare is received, it is because there are children in the household and 
this affects the hours worked in the case of women. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The primary aim of the paper is to test the effectiveness of a family policy 
measure, namely the universal child care cash benefit scheme, on the participation 
of women in the labour market in Spain. Spain is an interesting case study as it 
has one of the highest unemployment rates in the European Union (second only to 
Greece) and many social and economic inequalities persist, which may have been 
exacerbated by the austerity policies implemented in recent years. Additionally, 
business owners and Spanish society in general do not seem able to overlook the 
stigma of working mothers of young children. This paper examines whether the 
universal child care cash benefit scheme has a positive impact on the supply of 
working hours of women, under the hypothesis that in countries with low female 
labour force participation, as is the case of Spain, this sort of measure facilitates 
the participation of women in the labour market. Our results prove the 
effectiveness of the “baby bonus” in reconciling family life with working life. We 
find evidence to support our main hypothesis (i.e. that in countries with low 
female labour force participation, this type of policy fosters the participation of 
women in the labour market), that translates into a real impact of the policy of an 
average increase of about two hours per week in the supply of working hours of 
mothers who received the €2,500 family support payment (ATT=1.94). This 
result is robust when individual characteristics are taken into account. The effect 
is highly relevant, particularly if we take into account the modest size of the 
“baby bonus”, the short period of time that it was available and the barriers that 
exist when it comes to accessing public day care. This sort of universal family 
policy facilitates the participation of mothers in the labour market and most likely 
helps women overcome the economic obstacles that delay or prevent women 
having children. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1A 
Reasons for not working, with a job. Maternity/Paternity Leave (=1). Extended leave of 
absence to raise children (=2). LFS 2007-2012. % 
Period 
Males Females Females between 16 and 45 years 
1 2 1 2 1 2 
2007_1t 0.24  
0.53 
0.19 8.48  
7.48 
5.05 11.55  
10.12 
6.82 
2007_2t 0.74 0.05 10.57 4.57 14.20 6.14 
2007_3t 0.34 0.05 3.79 1.81 5.06 2.39 
2007_4t 0.80 0.21 7.09 4.83 9.70 6.61 
2008_1t 1.30  
0.93 
0.11 7.94  
7.73 
4.53 10.70  
10.49 
6.11 
2008_2t 1.13 0.16 10.53 7.28 14.24 9.77 
2008_3t 0.44 0.03 3.96 2.56 5.38 3.46 
2008_4t 0.87 0.08 8.50 5.33 11.66 7.21 
2009_1t 0.96  
0.90 
0.12 8.82  
7.76 
6.07 12.03  
10.62 
8.17 
2009_2t 1.26 0.30 9.38 6.65 12.78 8.82 
2009_3t 0.45 - 3.64 2.49 5.04 3.39 
2009_4t 0.95 0.08 9.23 5.79 12.66 7.83 
2010_1t 0.81  
0.95 
0.17 9.94  
8.84 
5.93 13.97  
12.40 
8.20 
2010_2t 1.30 0.11 11.49 6.95 16.05 9.51 
2010_3t 0.44 0.11 3.96 2.58 5.51 3.58 
2010_4t 1.28 0.24 9.98 4.91 14.10 6.94 
2011_1t 1.38  
1.10 
0.06 10.22  
8.60 
5.92 14.73  
12.34 
8.58 
2011_2t 1.46 0.28 9.23 5.43 13.34 7.88 
2011_3t 0.48 0.10 4.23 2.02 6.06 2.84 
2011_4t 1.11 0.04 10.74 3.77 15.25 5.32 
2012_1t 1.61  
0.99 
0.16 13.23  
9.71 
4.38 19.32  
14.28 
6.35 
2012_2t 0.92 0.06 10.41 4.20 15.49 6.16 
2012_3t 0.42 0.02 3.80 1.66 5.65 2.49 
2012_4t 1.01 0.14 11.42 3.40 16.67 4.98 
Source: Economically Active Population Survey (Spanish National Institute of Statistics). 
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